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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal—which raises questions involving the 
state action doctrine and the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment—has important ramifications for 
private hospitals that partner with public universities. Angela 
Borrell, a student working at a private hospital through a 
public university’s clinical program, was dismissed for 
refusing to take a drug test in violation of hospital policy. She 
sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming she was deprived of 
her property interest in the program without due process. 
Contrary to the judgment of the District Court, we hold that 
Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
I 
In 2007, Geisinger Medical Center (Geisinger or 
GMC) partnered with Bloomsburg University to establish the 
Nurse Anesthetist Program (NAP or Program). A private 
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hospital, Geisinger runs the “Clinical Training portion of the 
Program” for the aspiring nurse anesthetists while 
Bloomsburg, a public university, teaches them in the 
classroom. App. 1510. The Program operates subject to a 
written collaboration agreement that provides, among other 
things, that Geisinger and Bloomsburg will cooperate by: 
establishing a joint admissions committee, staffing an 
advisory committee, agreeing on how many students to admit, 
approving guidelines for clinical training, and promoting and 
marketing the Program. In other ways, Geisinger’s and 
Bloomsburg’s principal roles in the Program remain distinct. 
Geisinger provides certificates upon completion of its clinic 
and Bloomsburg confers Master of Science degrees to 
students who complete both the coursework and the clinical 
component.  
NAP students in Geisinger’s clinic administer medical 
care to patients under the supervision of Geisinger employees. 
Accordingly, the collaboration agreement states that 
Geisinger’s policies—including its drug and alcohol policy—
apply to NAP students while participating in the clinic. See 
App. 1512. The agreement also provides that Geisinger has 
sole authority to remove an enrollee from the clinical portion 
of the NAP due to unsatisfactory performance or failure “to 
comply with applicable policies and standards of Geisinger.” 
App. 9. Likewise, Bloomsburg’s Student Handbook requires 
students to “comply with the drug and alcohol policies and 
drug testing procedures as required by agencies affiliated with 
the Department of Nursing,” which includes Geisinger. 
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Borrell v. Bloomsburg Univ., 63 F. Supp. 3d 418, 425 (M.D. 
Pa. 2014) (quoting policy).1  
Geisinger’s drug and alcohol policy applies to all its 
employees and contractors (including clinical students 
working there). The policy states that drug tests “may be 
administered upon reasonable suspicion of substance abuse, 
(this may include [individual] situations . . . where HR is 
made aware of alleged drug/alcohol use and deems it as 
reasonable cause to test the employee).” App. 1529. Any 
Geisinger worker “who refuses to cooperate in any aspect [of 
the testing process] . . . shall be subject to disciplinary action, 
including termination, for a first refusal or any subsequent 
refusal.” App. 1527. The policy does not provide for any pre-
termination hearing or process.  
The Director of the NAP at all times relevant to this 
case was a Geisinger nurse anesthetist named Arthur Richer. 
In that capacity, Richer became a joint employee of Geisinger 
and Bloomsburg, with Bloomsburg picking up a quarter of his 
salary. Richer managed the clinical component of the NAP at 
Geisinger while Michelle Ficca (Bloomsburg’s Chair of 
Nursing) oversaw the Program’s academic component. 
                                                 
1 Bloomsburg’s Student Handbook “also sets forth a 
‘review process’” for students suspected of violating its 
terms. Borrell, 63 F. Supp. 3d at 426. The Student Nurse 
Anesthetist Handbook in the collaboration agreement allows 
students to “initiate a grievance” if they have a complaint 
about a disciplinary action and commits “to being reasonable 
in an attempt to correct [any] offense.” Id. The purported 
violation in this case was of GMC’s drug and alcohol policy, 
which provides no grievance process. 
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In 2012, Richer terminated Angela Borrell for 
violating Geisinger’s drug and alcohol policy by refusing to 
take a drug test when asked. Borrell, who previously had been 
a registered nurse at GMC, enrolled in the NAP in 2011 and 
began her clinical work in 2012. In September 2012, another 
nurse reported to Geisinger’s Assistant Director of the NAP 
that Borrell used cocaine and “acted erratically” on a recent 
trip to New York. Borrell, 63 F. Supp. 3d at 427. This claim 
was relayed to Richer, who had previously “noticed that 
Borrell appeared disheveled on a few occasions.” Id. Richer 
discussed the allegation with three other GMC employees and 
Ficca—his counterpart at Bloomsburg. Richer and a member 
of Geisinger’s Human Resources Department then met with 
Borrell and asked her to take a drug test. During this meeting, 
which lasted about an hour, Borrell asked several questions 
about the reason for the test and called her mother for advice. 
Borrell eventually refused to take the drug test, stating she 
“did not want her record to show that she submitted to a 
drug/urine screen.” Id. at 428. Richer informed Borrell that 
she would have “no option to test later” and claims he told 
Borrell she might be terminated for refusing the test, but 
Borrell responded that she was willing to “face the 
consequences.” Geisinger Br. 10. Borrell claims she was 
warned of “consequences” generally, but not termination. 
Borrell, 63 F. Supp. 3d at 428. 
After consulting with Geisinger’s Human Resources 
Department, Richer decided to dismiss Borrell from the 
Program the next day. He claims he did so in his capacity as 
Director of the clinical training portion of the NAP, and that 
Bloomsburg and Ficca played no part in the decision—though 
he informed them of it. In a September 25, 2012 letter, Richer 
informed Borrell that she was terminated from the NAP for 
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her refusal to take a drug test. A draft of that letter was 
circulated among Geisinger Human Resources, Ficca, and 
Richer, who “all provided comments and suggestions as to 
the contents of the letter.” Id. at 429. Richer then sent a final 
copy to Human Resources and Ficca. The letter was printed 
on joint GMC/Bloomsburg stationery and Richer and Ficca 
signed it. Richer signed as the “Director of the NAP,” and 
Ficca signed indicating that she “reviewed the above 
information and agree[d] with the decision to terminate 
Angela Borrell from the . . . Program.” Id. (first alteration in 
original).  
After she received the letter terminating her from the 
Program, Borrell tried to contact “Richer and others at both 
Geisinger and Bloomsburg . . . to state her willingness to 
submit to a drug test.” Id. That request was denied. Borrell 
then requested, but did not receive, a formal hearing from 
Bloomsburg to contest her termination from the Program. 
Ficca replied that since Bloomsburg had to honor Geisinger’s 
drug policy, disqualification from GMC’s clinic made her 
ineligible to complete her coursework at Bloomsburg 
necessary to complete the Program. 
Borrell then commenced a § 1983 action in the United 
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
against GMC, Richer, Bloomsburg, and Ficca for, among 
other things, violation of her due process right to a pre-
deprivation hearing. The District Court granted Borrell’s 
motion for summary judgment with respect to GMC, Richer, 
and Ficca, holding them liable for denying Borrell due 
process. Essential to its holding, the District Court found that 
GMC and Richer were state actors and that Ficca was not 
entitled to qualified immunity. The Court then concluded that 
“because Defendants deprived Borrell of a property interest 
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while acting under color of state law when they dismissed her 
from the NAP without due process, her motion for summary 
judgment as to liability on the procedural due process 
deprivation of property interest claim will be granted.” Id. at 
423. The case was then tried to a jury on the issue of 
damages. The jury awarded Borrell $415,000 in 
compensatory damages and $1,100,000 in punitive damages. 
Later granting the Defendants’ remittitur motions, the District 
Court reduced Borrell’s compensatory damages to $250,000 
and her punitive damages to $750,000. 
GMC, Richer, and Ficca timely appealed the adverse 
summary judgment along with other issues from the 
subsequent trial. 
II 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331 and 1343. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. We exercise plenary review over both “orders entered 
on motions for summary judgment,” Mancini v. Northampton 
Cty., 836 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2016), and decisions 
regarding qualified immunity as pure legal issues, Sharp v. 
Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 159 (3d Cir. 2012). 
Summary judgment should be granted only “if the 
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In considering a 
summary judgment decision, “we view the underlying facts 
and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Blunt v. Lower 
Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation 
omitted).  
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III 
The primary issue on appeal is whether GMC, Richer, 
or Ficca are liable for denying Borrell due process when she 
was dismissed from the NAP. Because (A) GMC and Richer 
are not state actors with respect to Richer’s decision to 
dismiss Borrell and (B) Ficca is entitled to qualified immunity 
for her involvement in Borrell’s termination, we hold that no 
Defendant is liable to Borrell. 
A 
First, we must determine whether the conduct of GMC 
and Richer should be considered state action. “The Fourteenth 
Amendment governs only state conduct, not that of private 
citizens.” Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009). So 
Borrell’s claim is not cognizable unless she was harmed 
“under color of law,” a standard identical to the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s “state action” requirement. United States v. 
Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966). 
In Kach, this Court summarized “three broad tests 
generated by Supreme Court jurisprudence to determine 
whether state action exists” in close cases and they are all 
“fact-specific.” 589 F.3d at 646. Those tests are: “(1) whether 
the private entity has exercised powers that are traditionally 
the exclusive prerogative of the state; (2) whether the private 
party has acted with the help of or in concert with state 
officials; and (3) whether the state has so far insinuated itself 
into a position of interdependence with the acting party that it 
must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged 
activity.” Id. (alterations and citation omitted). Of seminal 
importance to this appeal, we have clarified that the relevant 
question is not whether the private actor and the state have a 
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close relationship generally, but whether there is “such a 
close nexus between the State and the challenged action that 
seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the 
State itself.” Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 339 (3d Cir. 
2005) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). In other words, the 
government must be “responsible for the specific conduct of 
which the plaintiff complains.” Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 
991, 1004 (1982) (emphasis omitted). And this is true even 
when the actor is employed by the state. As we explained in 
Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, “an otherwise private tort is not 
committed under color of law simply because the tortfeasor is 
an employee of the state.” 51 F.3d 1137, 1150 (3d Cir. 1995). 
Contrary to Borrell’s argument, then, Richer’s joint 
employment with Bloomsburg and GMC’s partnership with 
Bloomsburg with respect to the Program do not “end the 
inquiry” on the state actor question. Borrell Br. 33.  
Rather, the pertinent question is whether Richer was 
wearing his Geisinger hat or his Bloomsburg hat when he 
decided to terminate Borrell. Actions taken “in the ambit of 
[non–state motivated] pursuits” are excluded from state 
action. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111 (1945). The 
record shows that Richer’s actions were authorized by 
Geisinger to enforce its drug and alcohol policy, and not 
pursued under any authority granted him by the state. Simply 
put, Richer did not need permission from Bloomsburg to fire 
a Geisinger worker who violated a hospital policy. 
In concluding that Geisinger acted under color of state 
law, the District Court focused on the fact that it “was a 
willful participant in joint activity, the NAP, with 
Bloomsburg.” Borrell, 63 F. Supp. 3d at 436. But as we 
noted, that should have been the beginning of the inquiry, not 
the end of it. The government must have also been closely 
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involved with the decision to terminate Borrell for that action 
to be “fairly attributable to the state.” Crissman v. Dover 
Downs Entm’t Inc., 289 F.3d 231, 245 n.18 (3d Cir. 2002).  
The District Court found, and Borrell argues, that 
Geisinger’s termination of Borrell is “fairly attributable to the 
state” for two main reasons: (1) Richer, a joint employee of 
GMC and Bloomsburg, terminated Borrell via a letter on 
“joint Bloomsburg-Geinsinger station[e]ry”; and (2) Ficca, a 
Bloomsburg employee, was involved in the termination 
process by providing input to Richer regarding Borrell’s 
termination letter and by signing it. Borrell, 63 F. Supp. 3d at 
436. As discussed already, the fact that Richer was a joint 
employee does not answer the question of whether his 
decision to enforce GMC’s drug and alcohol policy by 
terminating Borrell was “caused by the exercise of some right 
or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct 
imposed by . . . a person for whom the State is responsible.” 
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). 
Richer’s decision was to enforce the hospital’s preexisting 
policy requiring employees to participate in drug tests when 
asked, and GMC had already fired four other nurses for 
violating the same policy. Neither Bloomsburg nor its 
agreement with Geisinger played any part in creating the 
policy enforced in this case; the agreement merely made clear 
that Geisinger’s employee policies would govern the behavior 
of clinical students while they were working at the hospital. 
In light of the controlling legal principles we have 
articulated, the question boils down to which entity—the 
hospital or the university—exercised the authority to 
terminate Borrell for a violation of Geisinger policies. The 
District Court concluded that because Ficca signed the 
termination letter and was consulted regarding its contents, 
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“Bloomsburg and Geisinger jointly participated in 
terminating Borrell from the NAP.” Borrell, 63 F. Supp. 3d at 
436. The Court also stated that because Richer terminated 
Borrell in his capacity as Director of the NAP, the decision 
was made under the auspices of his employment by 
Bloomsburg and therefore under the color of state law. Id. at 
437. 
The agreement between Geisinger and Bloomsburg 
indicates otherwise. It makes clear that Geisinger retained the 
authority to unilaterally “exclude a Student from participation 
in the Clinical Training” if the student doesn’t comply with a 
GMC policy. App. 1514. And when Richer made the decision 
to terminate Borrell for violating hospital policy, he acted in 
his capacity as a GMC employee, claiming he sought to 
maintain nursing standards at the hospital. And his capacity 
was not altered merely because he discussed this decision 
with—and received input on his letter from—Ficca and 
another joint-NAP employee. “Action taken by private 
entities with the mere approval or acquiescence of the State 
is not state action.” Kach, 589 F.3d at 649 (citation omitted). 
Ficca’s signature on the termination letter purports to do 
nothing more than concur with Richer’s decision, which is 
not enough for state action. Rather, the state must have 
“exercised control over the particular conduct that gave rise to 
the plaintiff’s alleged constitutional deprivation.” Id. Under 
the collaboration agreement, Bloomsburg had no such 
control. 
Notwithstanding his consultation with others, Richer 
made the decision to fire someone working at GMC due to 
her violation of a preexisting policy of the hospital, and he 
had the authority to do so based on his position there. “[T]he 
authority of state officials . . . was wholly unnecessary to 
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effectuate Borrell’s dismissal from the NAP.” GMC Third-
Step Br. 18. Accordingly, we must reverse the District 
Court’s holding that GMC and Richer were state actors. 
B 
 Turning to the case against Ficca, we hold that she is 
entitled to qualified immunity. We do so because it was not 
clearly established that Ficca’s agreement with Richer’s 
decision, which she reasonably believed to be within his 
authority as an employee of GMC, violated Borrell’s 
constitutional rights. 
Qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly 
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley 
v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). If a government 
official—in this case, Ficca—reasonably thinks her conduct 
complies with the law, she is shielded from liability. See 
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 244 (2009). Ficca is 
entitled to qualified immunity as long as she does not violate 
a “clearly established” constitutional or federal right. Sharp, 
669 F.3d at 159 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 
(2001)). “A right is clearly established for qualified immunity 
purposes where its contours are ‘sufficiently clear that a 
reasonable official would understand that what [s]he is doing 
violates that right.’” Id. (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202). In 
other words, the application of the right to the issue at hand 
must be “beyond debate.” Zaloga v. Borough of Moosic, 841 
F.3d 170, 175 (3d Cir. 2016). 
The record indicates that it is hardly “beyond debate” 
that Ficca violated Borrell’s due process rights. Although 
many cases have concluded that graduate students at public 
universities have property interests in continuing their 
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education, see Borrell, 63 F. Supp. 3d at 458 (citing cases), 
those cases do not speak to the right of a clinical student at a 
private hospital to a hearing or comparable process before 
termination—even if the natural consequence of that 
termination is an inability to complete an educational 
program. The District Court pointed to no cases even 
suggesting such a right and we are aware of no such case. 
And the district court cases cited cannot clearly establish law 
for qualified immunity purposes in any event. See Camreta v. 
Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011). 
Furthermore, there is no evidence of record to suggest 
that Ficca could have done anything to stop Richer’s decision 
to deny additional process to Borrell before terminating her 
from the Program. The agreement between Geisinger and 
Bloomsburg states that GMC “shall have sole authority and 
control over all aspects of Clinical Training.” App. 1512. And 
while the agreement requires Geisinger to notify Bloomsburg 
before dismissing a student, Geisinger had the unilateral 
authority to dismiss students from the clinical portion of the 
Program, which would preclude them from obtaining the 
certificate necessary to become a nurse anesthetist. And if 
Ficca had no authority over Richer’s decision to terminate 
Borrell, a reasonable official in Ficca’s position would not 
have known that she owed Borrell any more process. 
As for Ficca’s concurrence with Richer’s decision to 
terminate Borrell, agreement is insufficient to demonstrate 
liability absent actual authority to make the decision. And 
without actual decisionmaking authority, Ficca’s edits, 
suggestions, and participation in the termination letter do not 
amount to a constitutional violation. Cf. McLaughlin v. 
Watson, 271 F.3d 566, 573 (3d Cir. 2001). Additionally, any 
process provided by Ficca at Bloomsburg could not have 
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forced Geisinger or Richer to change the decision to terminate 
Borrell from the clinical portion of the Program based on her 
violation of hospital policy. As Ficca notes by way of 
analogy, if she “had dismissed Borrell from the Program for . 
. . failing grades or cheating on an examination . . . no one 
would say that she was entitled to a hearing from Geisinger.” 
See Ficca Br. 25. Likewise, it’s not clear that Borrell was 
owed a hearing from Ficca before Geisinger dismissed her 
from the Program.  
To support her claim that Ficca supervised Richer’s 
termination decision, Borrell notes that Ficca responded 
affirmatively when asked: “You are one person who Mr. 
Richer would need to consult [before terminating a clinical 
student], correct?” App. 329. But in context, Ficca had 
claimed she did not know whether Richer was the final 
decisionmaker on dismissals of clinical students and merely 
asserted that Richer likely had to “discuss[]” any such 
decision with other parties to make sure he was correctly 
applying “policies that have been established.” App. 328–29. 
Given the collaboration agreement’s requirement that 
Bloomsburg had to receive notice of a termination decision, 
this answer does not show that Ficca had authority to prevent 
Richer’s decision. It shows only that she had to be notified of 
it.2 
                                                 
2 Borrell also claims that Ficca was “Richer’s direct 
supervisor at [Bloomsburg],” and is thus liable because she 
“did not take any steps to prevent her subordinate Richer 
from sending the termination letter.” Borrell Br. 61 (citing 
App. 553–54). But in the deposition to which Borrell refers, 
Richer stated only that Ficca was “above” him “[i]n the 
University hierarchy.” App. 554. While Ficca supervised 
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In responding to Ficca’s qualified immunity argument, 
Borrell seems to miss the relevant question—would a 
reasonable official have known that her actions violated a 
clearly established right? Even if, as Borrell claims, Ficca 
should have known that Richer’s actions were disciplinary 
and not academic, and Borrell was thus entitled to more 
process from someone, this does not answer the question of 
whether Ficca was that person. Given all the factors discussed 
herein, and given her reasonable understanding that she could 
not have provided process for the clinical dismissal even if 
she thought it was necessary in the abstract, the District Court 
should have granted qualified immunity to Ficca. 
IV 
For the reasons stated, we will reverse the District 
Court’s summary judgment and remand the case for entry of 
judgment in favor of Geisinger, Richer, and Ficca. 
                                                                                                             
Richer for university business, she did not supervise him in 
his other capacities—such as his GMC-related supervisory 
duties. Nothing in the NAP agreement gave Bloomsburg or 
Ficca authority to control a decision by Geisinger or Richer to 
remove a student from GMC’s clinic, and thus the Program. 
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Judge Roth, concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment: 
 
 In regard to Part III.B, I would hold that Ficca and 
Bloomsburg University’s participation in the dismissal of 
Borrell from the program was academic, not disciplinary.  
Although Borrell’s academic marks were satisfactory, once 
she had been dismissed from the clinical portion of the NAP 
program by Geisinger, she was no longer academically 
qualified to complete the NAP.  For that reason, she was not 
being dismissed from the Bloomsburg University portion of 
the program because she refused to take the drug test.  She 
was being dismissed because she was no longer academically 
eligible to complete the program.  Clearly, this action is 
academic, rather than disciplinary.   
 
 Moreover, because Ficca and Bloomsburg University’s 
action in dismissing Borrell from the program was not 
disciplinary, she in fact received all the due process to which 
she was entitled.  See, e.g., Board of Curators of the 
University of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 85 (1978). 
